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Wheat or Strawberries? Intermediated Trade with Limited
Contracting.
By Kala Krishna and Yelena Sheveleva ∗
Why do developing countries fail to specialize in products in which
they appear to have a comparative advantage? We propose a model
of agricultural trade with intermediation that explains how hold-up
resulting from poor contracting environments can produce such an
outcome. We use the model to explore the role of production sub-
sidies, support prices, easing sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) re-
quirements, and the creation of local markets in resolving the hold-
up problem. The model highlights the importance of infrastructure
in aligning production outcomes with comparative advantage and
sheds light on the pass-through of the world price to the producer.
There is a large literature which documents that labor productivity in develop-
ing countries is significantly lower than in developed ones, and that this is more
so in agriculture than in manufacturing. For example, Caselli (2005) shows that
aggregate productivity for countries at the 90th percentile of income relative to
the countries at the 10th percentile is 22, while this ratio for agriculture is 45.1
Lagakos and Waugh (2013) show that for staples such as maize, rice, and wheat
the ratio is 146, 90, and 83 respectively, twice as high as for agriculture overall.
Yet farmers in developing countries persist in producing staples like wheat, corn
or maize, rather than exotic fruits and vegetables that are highly valued in urban
areas or export markets.
We explain why this could occur using a model of agricultural trade with in-
termediation and a lack of contract enforcement. In this setting comparative
advantage alone is far from sufficient for the efficient pattern of specialization
to take hold. We show how challenges of exporting agricultural produce exac-
erbate intermediation issues in poor contracting environments. Difficulties with
transport, storage, and meeting sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements
associated with perishable produce all hamper the ability of developing countries
to capitalize on their productivity advantages in the export market.
Using the model with intermediated trade we identify conditions which ensure
that agricultural producers make production decisions according to comparative
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advantage. We show that local markets for perishable agricultural products,
price guarantees, production subsidies as well as infrastructure improvements
that reduce transport costs help align comparative advantage and production.
The environment in a developing country is very different from that in a devel-
oped one. A number of factors limit the farmer’s ability to transport his produce
to an urban or export location by himself: roads are poor, trucks are expensive,
and credit markets are poorly developed. Hence a farmer must rely on interme-
diaries (traders) to access these markets. At the same time, traders are scarce,
irregular in their arrivals, and unreliable in their promises as contracts are poorly
enforced. Though improvements in the contracting environment can alleviate the
challenges of farm-gate trade in a developing country, the required judicial and
political reforms to do this are difficult and time consuming to implement. We
therefore take as given the problematic contracting environment in less developed
countries, and build a simple model that captures essential features of such an
environment.
In our setup, farmers have the technology to produce a staple, which we call
wheat, and an exotic perishable produce, which we call strawberries. These goods
differ along four dimensions: the farmer’s ability to consume them, the farmer’s
efficiency in producing them, the kind of market in which they are traded, and the
degree of perishability. The first good, wheat, is a storable staple that a farmer can
subsist on and which is sold in a competitive market. The second, strawberries,
is a perishable non-staple which is traded only through intermediaries. Farmers
can survive on their wheat if need arises, but not on strawberries. Not only are
strawberries nutritionally inadequate, but they are perishable, and have to be
sold quickly. This gives intermediaries bargaining power when markets are thin,
and makes farmers reluctant to grow strawberries, which makes intermediaries
reluctant to enter, resulting in the expected thin markets materializing.
Traders, unlike farmers, have access to a competitive market for strawberries.
Entry into intermediation is free and traders incur a sunk cost of entry. Farmers
and traders cannot contract on price ex-ante and traders arrive at the farm-gate
according to a random process. The trader who offers the highest price to the
farmer gets the strawberries.2 If there is no trader at the farmer’s door step, he
exercises his outside option. In the baseline version of the model the farmers’
outside option is given exogenously. It can be positive if a farmer can sell his
produce to say, a canning factory, or it could be zero if no such option is available.
We then extend the model to endogenize the farmer’s reservation price through
the introduction of a competitive local market for strawberries.
We first solve the baseline model with an exogenous outside option and char-
acterize all the possible equilibria as a function of the primitive parameters. Of
particular interest is the region in parameter space with multiple equilibria where
the hold-up problem occurs. Hold-up occurs because traders cannot credibly
2Outcomes are unaffected by whether we assume the trader knows how many competitors he faces,
or not, as will be explained later on.
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promise a worthwhile price to farmers if they make strawberries. Ex-post, a
trader who is the sole buyer has no incentive to pay the farmer more than his
outside option. Anticipating this, the farmer chooses not to produce strawberries
unless he believes that enough traders will enter to ensure competition. However,
were more farmers to produce strawberries, more traders would enter and this
would make the production of strawberries profitable. So depending on farmers
and traders beliefs about one another’s actions, two equilibria could occur. In the
“good” equilibrium farmers specialize in strawberries, which they have a compar-
ative advantage in, and there is intermediation. In the “bad” equilibrium, there
is no intermediation and the staple is produced.
The analysis of the model suggests that even if the government is not able to re-
solve the core issue, namely the underlying lack of enforceable contracts, there are
policies that ensure specialization according to comparative advantage. An export
board that provides farmers with an outside option, or a production subsidy for
strawberries, eliminates the “bad” equilibrium, with the production subsidy being
a more efficient policy than the export board. Agricultural extension programs
and easing of SPS restrictions can also eliminate the “bad”equilibria.
We then extend the baseline model to include competitive local markets, where
farmers can sell strawberries but which require traders and farmers pay an access
cost. Such local markets, provide an endogenous outside option to farmers. The
magnitude of this outside option depends on the total cost of accessing these local
markets for farmers and traders and the export price of strawberries. Therefore,
a sufficiently low cost of accessing the local market provides an outside option
high enough to eliminate the coordination failure. Similarly, agricultural exten-
sion programs (which raise productivity) and easing of SPS requirements (which
effectively increase the export price) raise the farmer’s pay-off in the local market
and can also eliminate the “bad” equilibria.
Our model suggests that farmers near cities and trading centers, where they
have easy access to local markets, are less likely to be subject to hold-up and are
more likely to produce in line with comparative advantage. In remote locations,
on the other hand, farm-gate trade is likely to be prevalent and farmers fearing
the power of intermediaries may choose not to produce strawberries.
The extent to which farmers share in the gains from higher export prices also
depends on their access to a local market. With local markets, the level of in-
termediation is independent of export price fluctuations, and the farm-gate price
adjusts one for one in response to world price changes. In contrast, without local
markets, pass-through is incomplete and depends on the level of intermediation
at the farm-gate: the thinner the intermediary market, the lower is the extent of
pass-through. Thus farmers, especially those in more remote locations and thin
intermediary markets, may benefit little from higher world prices.
In the rest of the introduction we discuss the modeling assumptions we make,
provide anecdotal evidence in support of the model and relate it to the wider
literature.
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A. Motivating the Modeling Assumptions
While agricultural trade is a complex phenomenon, the model we present in
subsequent sections focuses on some of its essential aspects in order to retain
tractability. In this section we turn to the existing empirical literature and case
studies to motivate our modeling choices and discuss historical examples of the
hold-up problem that our paper focuses on.
Fafchamps, Gabre-Madhin and Minten (2005) describe the environment in
which agricultural farmers and traders interact in Africa. They document that
there are a large number of small intermediaries who specialize in buying from
producers and selling to wholesale traders or exporters. In our model we focus
on these small itinerant traders.
Fafchamps and Hill (2005) document that farmers in Africa face a decision
whether to sell their produce at the farm-gate, or to travel to the nearest organized
market. Farmers are less likely to travel to the market and more likely to sell to
an itinerant trader when the nearest market is far, or the cost of transportation
is high. Similarly, Osborne (2005) finds that in poorer and more remote areas,
traders have more market power than in markets that are located close to big
trading centers. Consistent with their findings, in our model, farmers in remote
areas tend to sell at the farm-gate at lower prices and farmers close to ports with
access to markets sell at higher prices.
A number of historical examples of the hold-up issue that we focus on in the
paper have been documented. One such account can be found in Kranton and
Swamy (2008). They argue that the Opium Agency, initiated by the East India
Company (EIC) in India, had a similar problem and recognized it. As the agency
was the sole procurer of opium it had monopsony power so that its agents had
incentives to behave opportunistically towards farmers. Such behavior would have
resulted in farmers switching to other crops. In order to prevent this the Opium
Agency expended significant resources monitoring their own agents.
The role that cooperatives played in establishing the dairy industry in India,
e.g., the Amul cooperative, is another historical account that supports our model.
In India prior to “Operation Flood,”milk was hard to come by in urban areas.
Farmers were reluctant to produce milk because of the risk of spoilage and the
lack of distribution channels. Dairy cooperatives that took hold in India during
“Operation Flood” encouraged production by giving farmers a “fair” price for
their milk. The success of the cooperatives was a key part of the “white revolu-
tion” when India went from being a milk deficient nation in the 1970s to being
the world’s largest milk producer in 2011.3
An important feature of our work is that we do not allow for the possibility of
repeated interactions between farmers and traders. This is justified by the extent
of uncertainty that prevails in developing countries. Weather variability, political
uncertainty and disease, all of which make people focus on the short term so
3See Delgado, Narrod and Tiongco (2003) for more on how the white revolution occurred in India.
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that the future is highly discounted. Such considerations call for the use of static
models that exclude repeated interactions and relational contracting.
Long term relations and reputational concerns have received a lot of atten-
tion in recent years and have been shown to play an important role in facilitating
contracts. Banerjee and Duflo (2000) focus on the role played by repeated interac-
tions in the software industry in India. Macchiavello and Morjaria (forthcoming)
focus on the role of repeated interactions in the context of rose exports from
Kenya, while McMillan and Woodruff (1999) look at credit relations among firms
in Vietnam. Antrs and Foley (2015) show that prepayment for orders is more
common when relational capital is low, i.e., at the start of a relationship. Greif
(2005) uses historical examples to study how contractual problems were resolved
among Magrabi traders. All these are established markets. Here, as in Kranton
and Swamy (2008), we assume that relational contracts are not possible. Our
focus is on why certain markets do not come into being when there is no repeated
interaction, rather than on the operation of established markets with repeated
interactions.
B. Relation to Existing Work
Our work fits into recent literature dealing with the effects of productivity and
trade costs on patterns of specialization, see Costinot and Donaldson (2012),
Costinot, Donaldson and Smith (2016), Sotelo (2015). However, all of this work
abstracts from intermediation and the related frictions that arise. In contrast, we
focus on precisely such frictions and explore their interaction with trade costs in
defining (often suboptimal) patterns of specialization.
Our work is related to Antras and Costinot (2011) who introduce intermediation
into a two-good two-country Ricardian framework to analyze the implications of
globalization. They focus on the welfare effects of integration in the goods market
versus intermediary markets, and, in contrast to us, assume that contracts are
fully enforced and hold-up is not possible.
Our model highlights how intermediation in the absence of contracts can lead
to a hold-up problem and multiple equilibria and looks for appropriate policies
to resolve it. Other papers that have emphasized multiplicity of equilibria and
explored how policy intervention can be welfare improving include the big push
and unbalanced growth theories as in Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Nurkse (1961),
Hirschman (1988), and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989). This line of work
has relied on demand externalities to generate multiple equilibria. In contrast, we
focus on the contracting imperfections which result in the coordination failures
that make farmers choose to produce low priced staples, despite seemingly more
lucrative options being available.
Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) and Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) por-
tray development as a process of self-discovery. Our model does not rely on
the lack of self-knowledge to explain the shortage of investment in nontraditional
products. With contractual frictions farmers know about their options but choose
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not to avail of them because nontraditional product markets are thin and hold-up
is likely.
Our paper is also related to a literature that focuses on price transmission in
agricultural trade. Fafchamps and Hill (2008) analyze transmission of the export
coffee price to the farmer who sells at the farm-gate. They find evidence of
incomplete pass-through from the international price to farm-gate prices in their
data. They argue that the cause of this incomplete pass-through is the lack of
information about world price movements on the part of the farmer.4 Our model
provides an alternative explanation for incomplete pass-through that does not rely
on information frictions. In our set up, it is farmers in remote locations without
access to competitive local markets who suffer from the incomplete pass-through
of the export prices. When farmers have the option to sell at a local market where
price adjusts one-to-one with the export price, the pass-through of the world price
into the farm-gate price is complete.
A good deal of attention has been paid recently to the role of infrastructure
in facilitating market access and encouraging development. Casaburi, Glenner-
ster and Suri (n.d.) provide evidence that rural roads reduce search costs and
encourage intermediation. Using a regression discontinuity framework, they show
that the price of the local crop, namely rice, falls with the construction of rural
roads. This occurs due to competition from more efficient producers outside the
region. Since in our model the intermediated good is not consumed locally, road
improvements effectively reduce the cost of getting the export good to the market
and increase producer price whether at the farm-gate or the local market.
We proceed as follows. Section 1 lays out the model and constructs the equi-
librium. Section 2 explores its welfare properties and ranks policies that can
eliminate the coordination failure. Section 3 incorporates a local market where
farmers can sell their produce if no intermediary shows up at the farm-gate.
Section 4 deals with the role of infrastructure, agricultural extension programs
and SPS requirements in facilitating agricultural exports. It also discusses the
pass-through of changes in world prices into domestic ones. Section 5 concludes.
I. The Model
The modelling framework builds on Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Gale-
nianos and Kircher (2008). The economy consists of a continuum of farmers of
measure one and a continuum of traders whose measure θ is determined endoge-
nously in equilibrium. Each farmer is endowed with one unit of labour which
produces a single unit of the staple or α units of the perishable good. Farmers
can either consume the staple or sell it at a given price which is normalized to
unity.
The perishable good is traded in the competitive world market to which farm-
4Mitra et al. (2015) is another paper that looks at the role of information on prices using an experi-
mental framework.
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ers have no access without intermediaries. The trader buys the good from the
farmer at price p and sells it to the exporter at the world price, Pw, with the
objective of maximizing his expected profit πT (p). There are an infinite number
of potential traders who can become actual traders by paying a sunk entry cost
κF . Each trader who pays the sunk cost meets a single farmer at random, and
with probability Pk he meets k competitors at the farm-gate. The farmer sells
his strawberries to the trader offering the highest price.
The farmer chooses how much of his one unit of labour to allocate to the pro-
duction of the intermediated good l ∈ [0, 1], and how much to the production of
the subsistence good 1− l to maximize his profit, πF . He produces strawberries if
he expects a sufficient number of intermediaries to enter, making producing them
more profitable than producing wheat. The equilibrium that we will characterize
consists of three objects: l, θ, F (p), where F (p) is the distribution of prices that
traders offer upon entry into intermediation. All agents choose their strategies
simultaneously and take each other’s actions as given. The strategies are played
and the outcomes are revealed. Since all farmers and traders are ex-ante iden-
tical and of measure zero, their individual actions do not affect the equilibrium
outcome.
We assume that farmers and traders are risk neutral. This causes farmers to
specialize in either the export or the staple good.5
A. The Meeting Process
We assume that farmers and traders meet according to a Poisson process. This
process arises naturally when TF traders arbitrarily meet one out of N farmers
producing for export, and is convenient in modeling coordination frictions that
result when there are many small market participants.
Pk, the probability that a trader who randomly arrives at a farm-gate meets k
rivals, can be derived as follows. Let 1/N be the probability that a given trader
visits a given farmer. Then, if TF and N go to infinity, while their ratio is equal
to θ, i.e.,
lim
TF→∞,N→∞
TF
N
= θ,
Pk = lim
TF→∞,N→∞
(
TF − 1
k
)(
1
N
)k (
1−
1
N
)TF−1−k
=
θk
k!
e−θ.
It can also be shown that as the number of traders and farmers goes to infinity, the
probability that k traders arrive at a farmer’s gate (denoted by Qk) is identical
to Pk, the probability that a trader at the farm-gate meets k rivals.
5Adding risk aversion on the side of the farmers moves the economy away from the corner solution
as might be expected.
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B. The Trader’s Problem
The trader’s problem consists of two parts. For a given level of market interme-
diation, θ, a potential trader needs to decide whether to enter the intermediation
market or not. Upon entry he has to decide what price to offer to the farmer
he visits. As usual, we need to solve this backwards. Consider the problem of
optimally choosing the price to post given the distribution of prices of all other
traders.
Let p be the price that a trader offers to a farmer. The most important piece
of information for the trader is the distribution of prices that other traders offer,
F (p). For an arbitrary p, the probability that a given trader makes the highest
bid in a meeting with k rivals is given by [F (p)]k.6 The unconditional probability
that a trader offering price p is the highest bidder involves summing over the
number of potential rivals and is given by
∞∑
k=0
Pk[F (p)]
k =
∞∑
k=0
e−θ
θk
k!
[F (p)]k = e−θ(1−F (p)).
When αl∗ is the equilibrium output of the intermediated good, the trader who
wins offering price p makes (Pw − p)αl∗. Thus, the expected profit of a trader
offering price p is
πT (p) = (Pw − p)αl∗e−θ(1−F (p)).
Let R be the farmer’s reservation price, i.e., the farmer’s outside option. It
could be the price offered by a local canning factory, or it could be 0 if no such
option is available. Let pmax denote the upper bound of the support for the price
distribution. Next we summarize the properties of the distribution of price offers
in equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1: In the unique equilibrium of the price game, traders mix over
the interval [R, pmax] according to
(1) F (p) =
{
0 for p < R
1
θ
ln(P
w−R
Pw−p ) for R ≤ p ≤ p
max ,
where pmax, the upper bound of the support, is given by
pmax = P
w(1− e−θ) +Re−θ.
The traders’ expected profits equal (Pw −R)αl∗e−θ.
The proof is in the Appendix. Here we provide an intuitive explanation of the
results. First, we pin down traders’ profits at the farmer’s reservation price R.
6If p is a random draw from F (p), then the distribution of the maximum of the k random draws, i.e.,
{pi}
k
i=1 is [F (p)]
k.
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Since farmers do not accept a price below R no trader will offer such a price.
When a trader offers R a farmer accepts it only if no other trader shows up at
his farm-gate. Therefore, at R the trader’s profits are:
πT (R) = (Pw −R)αl∗e−θ = πT .
For F (p) to be the equilibrium distribution of prices, traders’ profits at every p in
its support must be the same, so that traders are willing to randomize over them.
In the appendix we show that F(p) is a continuous distribution with no gaps in
the support which starts at R. Hence at any p traders’ profits must be equal to
those at R:
(2) πT (p) = (Pw − p)αl∗e−θ(1−F (p)) = πT .
Following Burdett and Judd (1983) equation (2) yields F (p) uniquely as in (1).
Continuity of F (.) and absence of mass points makes economic sense: a gap in
the support would result in profits falling in price for such intervals, while a mass
point would result in a jump up in profits at prices just below the mass point.
Note each trader could offer a particular price, with different traders choosing
different prices so that F (p) emerges, or each trader could be mixing over prices
according to F (p). How the distribution arises is irrelevant for the equilibrium
outcomes.7
The upper bound of the support, pmax, is a convex combination of the world
price and the farmer’s reservation price.8 As the level of intermediation increases,
pmax increases, but as e
−θ < 1 for any value of θ, pmax remains below P
w. The
farmer’s reservation price, R bounds the value of pmax from below.
Trader’s expected profits given in equation (2) are increasing in Pw, and de-
creasing in R and θ. Note that these are exactly the profits of a trader competing
a la Bertrand who sets his price after observing the number of competitors he
faces at the farm-gate. If he has no competitors at the farm-gate, he offers the
farmer R and makes profits of αl∗(Pw − R). This event occurs with probability
e−θ. Otherwise, competition forces him to raise his price to Pw and he makes zero
profits.
Furthermore, whether traders observe the number of competitors before or after
they make offers yields same equilibrium expected price, level of intermediation
and the production decisions of farmers. For details see Krishna (2009). The ad-
vantage of the former assumption is that it gives rise to a continuous distribution
of farm-gate prices with the upper end of the support strictly below the world
price, which is consistent with documented price variations, e.g., see Fafchamps
7All that matters to a trader is the probability that his price is the highest and not the particular
strategies that other traders use.
8To see this note that: eθ = 1 + θ + θ
2
2!
+ θ
3
3!
... > 1 for any θ > 0 and thus, 0 < e−θ < 1.
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and Hill (2008).9
Now that we can evaluate the traders’ expected profits prior to entry, we can
consider their entry decision.
PROPOSITION 2: The free entry level of intermediation is
(3) θ =
{
ln
(
(Pw−R)αl∗
κF
)
if l∗ ≥ lmin
0 if l∗ < lmin
,
where
lmin =
κF
α(Pw −R)
.
PROOF:
Entry of traders will continue until:
πT (p) = κF .
Since profits are the same at every point in the support, we can solve for the level
of intermediation by equating profits at the lower end of the support, R, to the
cost of entry, κF :
(4) (Pw −R)αl∗e−θ = κF .
Solving equation (4) for θ gives
θ = ln
(
(Pw −R)αl∗
κF
)
.
Thus, the equilibrium level of intermediation is increasing in the world price and
the output of the export good. It is decreasing in the sunk cost and the farmer’s
reservation price. Note that θ > 0 if and only if
ln
(
(Pw −R)αl∗
κF
)
> 0,
or
l∗ > lmin =
κF
α(Pw −R)
.

Proposition 2 implies that positive levels of intermediation prevail when the
output of the export good, αl∗, exceeds a minimum level, denoted by αlmin =
κF /(P
w −R). In other words, if l∗ > lmin, intermediation occurs.
9Under the alternative assumption a two point distribution of prices arises over R and the world
price.
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C. The Farmer’s Problem
We now describe the problem of a risk neutral farmer. Let Gk(p) = [F (p)]
k be
the cumulative density function of the highest price offered when a farmer meets
k traders. Each farmer has a linear utility function defined over the units of the
staple good. A farmer who allocates l units of labor to the intermediated good
and 1− l units to the staple earns a profit
πF (l, p) = (αp− 1) l + 1,
when he sells the intermediated good at price p. Since the farmer is risk neutral
he maximizes expected profits, and since he only consumes the numeraire good,
his indirect utility is the same as his income.
Let E(p) be the price farmers expect to obtain for the export good at the
farm-gate. If αE(p) − 1 > 0, the farmer will produce only the export good.
When evaluating the expected price, farmers take the level of intermediation θ,
the pricing strategy of traders F (·), and the meeting process {Qk}
∞
k=0 as given.
Recall that Qk was defined as the probability that k traders arrive at a farmer’s
gate.
LEMMA 1: The expected price at the farm-gate is given by
E(p) =
∞∑
k=0
Qk
pmax∫
R
pdGk(p)(5)
= Pw
(
1− e−θ(1 + θ)
)
+Re−θ(1 + θ).
As 0 < e−θ(1 + θ) < 1, the expected price is a convex combination of the world
price Pwand the farmer’s reservation price R.10
The direct proof is in the Appendix. A useful intuition for the expression of the
expected price comes from the observation outlined previously, that the expected
price is the same whether traders make their bids before or after the number
of competitors has been observed. If at most one intermediary shows up at the
farm-gate, the farmer gets R. This happens with probability e−θ(1 + θ). If more
than one intermediary shows up at the farm-gate the price is bid up to Pw, which
happens with probability 1− e−θ(1 + θ). Hence the expression in equation (5).
The expected producer price increases with the world price Pw, and productiv-
ity of the export good α, and decreases with the cost of farm-gate intermediation
κF . Changes in α and κF operate via θ: a higher α and lower κF increase θ,
raising the weight on Pw. A higher Pw affects the expected price both directly,
and through raising the level of intermediation.
10To see this note that: eθ = 1+θ+ θ
2
2!
+ θ
3
3!
... > 1+θ for any θ > 0 so 1
1+θ
> e−θ or 1 > e−θ (1 + θ) .
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A higher value of R, on one hand, increases the farmer’s outside option and
therefore the expected farm-gate price. On the other hand, it decreases the level
of intermediation, which pushes the expected farm-gate price down. The direct
effect of an increase in R dominates and the expected price rises:
(6)
∂E(p|θ(l = 1))
∂R
= e−θ > 0.
A risk neutral farmer allocates labor between production of the export good
and the staple depending on which is more profitable. Hence, the farmers’ labor
supply as a function of the expected price is given by
l(E(p)) =
 1 if αE(p) > 1[0, 1] if αE(p) = 1
0 if αE(p) < 1.
Note that if αR ≥ 1 so is αE(p), and farmers specialize in the export good even
if no intermediaries enter, i.e., θ = 0. When αR < 1, whether or not farmers
specialize in the export good depends on the prevailing level of intermediation.
Define θmin as the minimum level of intermediation necessary to induce farmers to
produce the export good. As θ rises and E(p) exceeds 1/α, farmers specialize in
the production of the export good and l(.) = 1. We can write the farmers’ choice
of labor as the best response function to the prevailing level of intermediation:
(7) l(θ) =

1 when αR ≥ 1
1 for θ > θmin
[0, 1] if θ = θmin
0 for θ < θmin
when αR < 1.
Formally, θmin is the solution to αE(p) = 1 . It is easy to see that θmin does
not depend on κF and decreases as α , P
w or R rise.
D. Equilibrium
We first discuss the possible equilibrium configurations in terms of the traders’
and farmers’ best response functions. We then describe the relationship between
the primitive parameters and the equilibrium configurations that they imply.
In equilibrium, each farmer chooses what to produce, and each active trader
chooses what price to offer, so as to maximize their respective profits. All potential
traders are indifferent between becoming active or not, and the decisions of these
agents are mutually consistent.
The equilibrium consisting of three objects: θ, F (p), l(θ), is pinned down by
equations (3), and (1), and (7). Depending on the values of the primitive param-
eters there are four possible equilibrium configurations, all depicted in Figures
1a-1d. Figures 1a and 1b show the equilibrium outcomes when R < 1/α and
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farmers specialize in the staple unless there is enough intermediation. In Fig-
ures 1c and 1d R > 1/α, so that farmers will produce the intermediated good
regardless of the intermediation level.
In Figure 1a there is a unique equilibrium with complete specialization in the
staple good. θmin > θ(1) so that the best response functions l(θ) and θ(l) have
only one intersection at the origin. Even if all farmers specialized in strawberries,
intermediation would not be profitable. This occurs when Pw and α are low (e.g.,
agriculture is inefficient) and/or κF , the cost of entry for traders, is high.
Figure 1b depicts a case with multiple equilibria. The farmer’s best response
function, l(θ), and traders’ free entry condition, θ(l), intersect three times re-
sulting in three equilibria. There are two complete specialization equilibria where
farmers produce either strawberries or the staple, and an equilibrium where farm-
ers are indifferent between producing either one. Which of the equilibria occurs
depends on entry of intermediaries. When intermediaries enter, αE(p) > 1, all
farmers produce strawberries. If intermediaries do not enter, then all farmers pro-
duce the staple. When θ = θmin and αE(p) = 1, farmers are indifferent between
making either wheat or strawberries. This last equilibrium is unstable: small
perturbations will move the economy to one of the two stable equilibria. For this
reason in the rest of the paper we focus on the two stable equilibria.11
When R > 1/α, it is profitable to make strawberries even if there are no
intermediaries, so l ≡ 1. In this case, there are two possibilities. Either interme-
diaries enter in equilibrium or they do not. If intermediation is profitable when
intermediaries have no competition, i.e., their profits of α(Pw − R) exceed the
intermediation cost κF , then intermediation must occur in equilibrium. This case
is depicted in Figure 1c. Figure 1d depicts the case where α(Pw−R) < κF so that
intermediation is inherently unprofitable and does not occur. This case occurs
when R and/or κF are high or α and/or P
w are low.
Next we outline the conditions on the primitive parameters that give rise to
each of the equilibrium types. Figure 2 depicts the possible equilibrium outcomes
for different values of the primitive parameters R and κF given α and P
w.
When R < 1/α and κF is relatively low, whether farmers produce the export
good or not depends on their beliefs about the prevailing level of intermediation.
In this case, multiple equilibria in the sense of Figure 1b are endemic. In Figure 2
we call this regionM for Multiplicity. When κF becomes so high that traders find
it unprofitable to enter, none of the export good will be made. In Figure 2 this
region is labeled W for Wheat production, which corresponds to the situation in
11While we limit the discussion of the unstable equilibrium, it is worth noting that this equilibrium
may involve pure or mixed strategies on the part of the farmer. To see this, note that trader profits are
linear in l, so the free entry level of intermediation depends on the average output of the export good
per farmer. Let lˆ be the average level of output of strawberries per farmer such that θ(lˆ) = θmin, shown
in Figure 1b. It is easy to see that whether all farmers produce l = lˆ, or this fraction of farmers make
strawberries and the rest make wheat, the average output per farmer remains lˆ. More generally, whatever
is the output of the individual farmer, as long as the average output per farmer is lˆ, the best-response
level of intermediation θ(lˆ) = θmin implies αE(p) = 1, and farmers are indifferent between making either
of the two goods.
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Figure 1a. The boundary between region M and W is defined by the condition
E(p|θ) = 1/α as this is when farmers are indifferent between making the staple
or the export good. 12
When R is above 1/α, the farmer’s outside option for strawberries is high
enough so that making strawberries becomes his dominant strategy. When R >
Pw − κF /α, intermediation is unprofitable and no traders enter, so strawberries
are sold to the canning factory which pays R. In Figure 2 this corresponds to the
region labeled S −NF for Strawberries and No Farm-gate Intermediation. Only
in the triangular area, labeled S − F for Strawberries and Farm-gate Intermedi-
ation, is there a unique equilibrium where strawberries are produced and sold to
intermediaries.
This case is depicted in Figure 1c. The two regions are separated by the bound-
ary condition for intermediary entry: R = Pw − κF /α.
II. Efficiency Properties of the Equilibrium and Policy Implications
We now examine the efficiency properties of the equilibrium. Our main result
is that efficiency obtains when primitive parameters rule out multiplicity of equi-
libria. When multiple equilibria are endemic, only the equilibrium where farmers
specialize in the export good is constrained efficient. In other words, the source
of the inefficiency lies in the coordination failure.
In this section we will solve the social planner’s problem and describe the con-
strained efficient allocation in detail.
A. Constrained Efficient Allocation
A social planner chooses the level of intermediation and the labor that farmers
allocate to the production of the export good to maximize the aggregate output
subject to the constraint that traders and farmers meet randomly. This is a
standard notion of constrained efficiency in models with search frictions, see for
example Shi (2001) or Shimer (2005).
The planner maximizes welfare, which is the value of output net of the inter-
mediation costs, by choosing the socially optimal level of intermediation θP and
labor allocation lP :
(8) max
lP ,θP
[
Pw(1− e−θ
P
) +Re−θ
P
]
αlP − κF θ
P I[lP > 0] +
(
1− lP
)
where I[lP > 0] is the indicator function taking the value 1 when lP > 0 and 0
12More precisely, the boundary between the regions is given by a locus of R and κF that satisfy
the Pw(1 −
(
κF
(Pw−R)α
)
)(1 + ln
(
(Pw−R)α
κF
)
)) + R
(
κF
(Pw−R)α
)
(1 + ln
(
(Pw−R)α
κF
)
) = 1
α
obtained by
substituting θ(1) = ln
(
α(Pw−R)
κF
)
into the expression for E(p|θ) in equation (5).
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R < 1
α
0 θ
l
1
θmin
l(θ)
lmin
θ(l)
(a) Unique Equilibrium (W)
0 θ
l
1
lˆ
θmin
l(θ)
lmin
θ(l)
(b) Multiple Equilibria (M)
R ≥ 1
α
0 θ
l
1
θ(l)
l(θ)
lmin
(c) Unique Equilibrium (S-F)
0 θ
l
1
lmin
θ(l)
l(θ)
(d) UniqueEquilibrium (S-NF)
Figure 1. Types of equilibria.
otherwise. The first order condition
αlP e−θ
P
(Pw −R)− κF = 0,
implies that for any given level of lP the socially optimal level of intermediation
is
(9) θP (lP ) = max
{
0, ln
(
αlP (Pw −R)
κF
)}
.
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κF
R
Pw
S −NF
M
S − F
W
1
α
αP
w
− 1
Figure 2. Equilibrium Types in the R and κF space for sufficiently high P
w and α
Notice that this expression coincides with the trader’s best response function for
a given level of l, indicating that the level of intermediation is not distorted.
Given θP , the maximized welfare in equation (8) is linear in lP so the social
planner will set lP equal to either 0 or 1. He will assign all farmers to produce the
export good and set l = 1 when
(10)
[
Pw(1− e−θ
P (1)) +Re−θ
P (1)
]
α− κF θ
P (1) ≥ 1.
The left-hand side of the equation (10) corresponds to the level of welfare when
lP = 1, and the right-hand side corresponds to the level of welfare that arises
when only the staple is produced, lP = 0. At first sight this condition looks
different from the farmers’ choice of labor, namely choose l = 1 when
(11) αE(p) ≥ 1.
However, using equation (9), the social planner’s rule for labor allocation can be
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shown to be equivalent to that of the farmers’ in equation (11).13
So, the decentralized equilibrium is potentially inefficient only in the region
with multiple equilibria, i.e., region M in Figure 2. Here the decentralized alloca-
tion could result in wheat being made, while the social planner would prescribe
specialization in strawberries. The reason for the potential inefficiency is the co-
ordination failure. In this section we will explore policies that can resolve this
coordination failure and ensure that the decentralized allocation coincides with
the constrained efficient one.
It’s worth pointing out that even the constrained efficient allocation suffers from
a search inefficiency typically present in search and matching models: a farmer
may have no traders matched with him or a trader may lose to a competitor.
Such events involve waste relative to the operation of frictionless markets.
B. Eliminating the Coordination Failure
We have shown that the only distortion in the competitive allocation is due
to the coordination failure that generates the “bad” equilibrium in the region
with multiplicity, i.e., region M in Figure 2. The natural question to ask is
how policy can eliminate this inefficient outcome. If we can ensure that it is the
dominant strategy for the farmer to produce the export good, then the inefficiency
is eliminated and the economy attains the constrained optimum. One way to do
this is to offer a production subsidy. Another is to offer a price support as is often
done by export boards. We show below both policies can eliminate multiplicity.
The production subsidy however, dominates the price support in terms of welfare,
as the latter distorts the level of intermediation.
A Production Subsidy
Suppose the economy is in the region M and the government offers a per unit
subsidy slightly above 1/α−R, say s = 1/α−R+ ǫ. Then farmers will specialize
in the export good no matter what the level of intermediation is. Even with
no traders, farmers’ expected income from making the export good exceeds that
from making the staple: α(1/α−R+ ǫ) > 1. Thus, in Figure 1b, such a subsidy
ensures l(θ) = 1 independent of θ. Knowing that farmers will produce the export
good, traders will enter, and the “bad” equilibrium is eliminated.
13Consider equation (11):
α
[
Pw(1− e−θ(1 + θ)) +Re−θ(1 + θ)
]
≥ 1.
It can be rearranged as
α
[
Pw(1− e−θ) +Re−θ
]
− α (Pw −R) e−θθ ≥ 1.
As α (Pw −R) e−θ can be replaced by κF due to free entry, equation (10) coincides with equation (11).
The observation that the welfare in a constrained efficient allocation coincides with the expected revenue
of the farmers is more general and is going to be used again when we introduce local markets.
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In other regions the production subsidy is either ineffective or welfare decreas-
ing. In regionW , for example, farmers have a comparative advantage in the staple
and specialize in it. As a result, subsidizing production of strawberries reduces
overall welfare. If the economy is in the S−F or S−NF regions, farmers always
specialize in strawberries and the production subsidy will just be a transfer be-
tween the government and the farmers with no real effects on the producer price
or production decisions.
PROPOSITION 3: A per unit production subsidy greater than 1/α−R can elim-
inate the inefficient equilibrium and raise welfare if the economy is in region M .
It will lower welfare if the economy is in region W , and have no effect otherwise.
Export Board
Suppose the export board which incurs no costs pays the farmer R for straw-
berries and sells them to an importer or a canning factory for R0. What is the
effect of such an export board on welfare? Such a board effectively offers in-
surance to farmers who do not meet a trader. When the board offers R above
1/α, it ensures that farmers specialize in strawberries regardless of the level of
intermediation. In region M such an export board eliminates the multiplicity
of equilibria. However, in contrast to a production subsidy, a higher R reduces
the level of intermediation. A lower level of intermediation means that a smaller
share of the produced export good is sold at the world price Pw by intermediaries
and is instead sold at R0 by the export board. Thus with R0 < Pw, even if all
farmers make strawberries, welfare is below what it would be with a production
subsidy.
Figure 1b can be used to illustrate the effect of an export board raising R
starting with R0 in regionM . An increase in R raises the expected price as shown
in equation (6). This makes the farmer require a lower level of intermediation
before switching over to strawberries so that θmin moves to the left. Once R
reaches 1/α, farmers are willing to make strawberries even without intermediation
so that l(θ) = 1 for all θ, and the coordination failure is eliminated. In addition,
at every l there is less intermediation so that the θ(l) curve shifts up. As a result,
the equilibrium level of intermediation when strawberries are made falls below the
level of intermediation implied by R0 which introduces an additional distortion
into the competitive allocation.
PROPOSITION 4: In region M both per unit production subsidy or an export
board that sets R greater than 1/α can resolve the coordination failure. However,
welfare is higher when the production subsidy is used.
This makes perfect sense as the only distortion in the competitive allocation
is the coordination failure. A subsidy to production of more than 1/α − R fixes
this, leaving intermediation unaffected, while a price support that eliminates mul-
tiplicity reduces intermediation, introducing an additional distortion.
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Given that the board’s choice of R distorts the level of intermediation, it is
worth exploring how welfare changes with its choice of R. We show that as long
as the export good is produced welfare is maximized when the export board sets
R exactly equal to R0. In other words, an export board that pays farmer R
while selling the produce at R0 6= R distorts the level of intermediation in the
competitive allocation. This makes the case for boards that act in the farmer’s
interests once the coordination failure is resolved by setting R = R0.
To see this let R0 be the price that the board receives from selling strawberries.
As the board uses no resources in its operation, welfare is the value of output less
all costs and is given by:
(12) W = α(Pw(1− e−θ(R)) +R0e−θ(R))− κF θ(R).
Note that the share of output that is not sold to the intermediaries is sold at
R0, while the level of intermediation θ is a function of R, the price set by the
export board. Hence, an increase in R affects welfare only via its effect on θ. A
higher R reduces revenue by α
[
(Pw −R0)e−θ(∂θ/∂R)
]
but also reduces costs by
κF (∂θ/∂R). Substituting for e
−θ from the free entry condition the net effect is
∂W
∂R
= κF
(
Pw −R0
Pw −R
− 1
)
∂θ
∂R
.
Note that
∂W
∂R
= 0 if R = R0.
Thus, welfare is maximized at R = R0. An increase in R reduces intermediation
and raises the share of the output disposed of at R0 rather than Pw, which has
a negative effect on welfare. It also reduces the resources expended on entry. At
R = R0, these two just wash out.
III. Local Markets
An important aspect of agricultural trade in less developed countries is that
farm-gate trade coexists with organized markets. In this section we introduce
competitive local markets where farmers and traders can exchange the export
good at a single market clearing price. Introducing such local markets provides a
way of endogenizing the farmers’ reservation price.
Local markets provide a fallback for farmers who could not sell their produce
at the farm-gate. Without loss of generality in this section we assume that the
exogenous R described in the baseline model is 0, so farmers without a match
at the farm-gate go to the local market where they can sell their produce at the
market clearing price, PM . To access the local market each farmer pays the cost
τM which captures his travel and time cost of getting there.
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In contrast, traders face a choice between going to the farm-gate, the local
market or abstaining from intermediation altogether. As in the baseline model,
traders who go to the farm-gate pay the sunk cost κF , while traders who go to
the local market pay a sunk cost κM . We continue to assume that each trader
has a capacity of α units, and so can deal with only one farmer’s supply. While θ
continues to be the measure of traders at the farm-gate14, θM denotes the measure
of traders going to the local market. The local market is perfectly competitive and
farmers and traders take the price of strawberries as given. The equilibrium price
PM equates the supply of strawberries (by farmers) to the demand (by traders).
Q
PM
τM
α
Pw −
κM
α
κF
Pw
SM(PM)
DM(PM)
R(PM) = PM − τMα
Figure 3. Equilibrium in the local market
Supply in the local market comes from farmers. If PM < τM/α a farmer would
make a loss from selling to the local market, so supply is zero. When PM ≥ τM/α,
the local market provides a positive outside option to the farmer, and unmatched
farmers sell their produce in the local market. In this manner, the farmer’s pay-off
in the local market pins down his reservation price at the farm-gate:
R(PM ) = max
{
PM −
τM
α
, 0
}
.
Note that even when PM > τM/α, farmers prefer to be matched at the farm-gate
where there is a possibility of making more than what they would get at the
local market. As a result, only the output that is not sold at the farm-gate, i.e.,
αe−θ(R(P
M )), ends up at the local market.
From equation (3), a higher reservation price discourages trader entry at the
farm-gate. Since the reservation price R(PM ) increases with PM a rise in PM
14Recall that the measure of farmers is normalized to 1 so that the measure of traders at the farm-gate
is also the ratio of traders at the farm-gate to farmers, i.e., the thickness of this market. The measure of
traders in the local market is denoted as θM while the ratio of traders to farmers in the local markets is
unity in equilibrium as shown below.
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results in a fall in θ. A fall in θ in turn increases the number of farmers who
remain unmatched and sell in the local market. As a result, supply in the local
market rises with PM . The supply function is:
SM (PM ) =
{
αe−θ(R(P
M )) if PM ≥ τM
α
0 if PM < τM
α
and is depicted in Figure 3. Note that when PM = τM/α, R(P
M ) = 0 and
θ = ln(αPw/κF ), so that supply is κF /P
w.
Demand in the local market depends on trader entry in response to the pre-
vailing local market price, PM , and is a step function as depicted in Figure 3:
DM (PM ) =

0 if PM > Pw − κM
α
[0,∞] if PM = Pw − κM
α
∞ if PM < Pw − κM
α
.
When price in the local market, PM , is above Pw−κM/α, no trader will go there
as he is sure to make a loss. So the demand for strawberries is zero in this case. If
PM is less than Pw−κM/α, traders make positive expected profits and a flood of
entry into the local market is unleashed. In this case, the demand for strawberries
is unbounded. When PM is exactly equal to Pw − κM/α, expected profits from
going to the local market are zero so that traders are indifferent between going
to the local market, the farm-gate, or staying out of intermediation altogether.
Hence, at this price demand is perfectly elastic.
In Figure 3, the equilibrium in the local market is where supply and demand
intersect. Supply from farmers is zero when PM < τM/α, and demand from
traders is zero when PM > Pw−κM/α. As a result, positive quantities are traded
in the local market only when Pw ≥ (κM + τM )/α. In words, local markets are
viable if the total cost of accessing them for intermediaries and farmers together
does not exceed the per-unit world price of the export good. In the real world such
costs are related to the quality of roads and infrastructure. Since the demand for
the export good is perfectly elastic at PM = Pw − κM/α, the equilibrium price
when local markets are viable has to be
(13) PM
∗
= Pw −
κM
α
.
When Pw < (κM + τM )/α local markets are not viable, farmers have no alter-
native to the farm-gate trade, and we are back in the baseline case. This gives
the farmer’s endogenous reservation price in equilibrium to be
(14) R∗ = max
{
0, Pw −
(
κM + τM
α
)}
.
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Note that the farmer’s reservation price depends only on the sum of the costs
of accessing the local market to the farmer and to the trader, and not their
distribution over the two agents. The higher is this total cost, the lower is the
farmer’s outside option. Once the total cost of accessing the local market becomes
so high that the farmer’s pay-off to selling there turns negative, his reservation
price goes to zero.15 Note also that as there is a continuum of agents, PM and R
are not random.
With R∗ given in equation (14) and with l = 1, equation (3) implies that the
equilibrium level of intermediation at the farm-gate is
θ∗ = max
{
0, ln
(
α [Pw −R∗]
κF
)}
(15)
= max
{
0, ln
(
α
[
Pw −max
{
0, Pw −
(
κM+τM
α
)}]
κF
)}
= max
{
0, ln
(
min{αPw, κM + τM}
κF
)}
.
When local markets are viable, θ∗ = ln ((κM + τM )/κF ), so that the level of
intermediation does not depend on the world price or agricultural productivity
but only on the ratio of the total cost of accessing the local market relative to the
farm-gate.
Similarly the expected price at the farm-gate depends on whether the local
market is viable or not. If Pw ≥ κM+τM
α
, then local markets are viable, θ∗ =
ln
(
κM+τM
κF
)
, and the expected price the farmer obtains is
EL(p) = P
w −
κM + τM
α
(1 + θ∗)e−θ
∗
= Pw −
κF
α
(
1 + ln
(
κM + τM
κF
))
.
If κF
α
< Pw < κM+τM
α
, then local markets are not viable and the endogenous
reservation price is zero, θ∗ = ln(αP
w
κF
), and the expected price is
EL(p) = P
w(1− (1 + θ∗)e−θ
∗
)
= Pw −
κF
α
(1 + ln
αPw
κF
)).
Of course, if Pw ≤ κF
α
then θ∗ = 0, and the expected price is equal to the farmer’s
outside option R∗ = 0. Thus, the expected price in the relevant scenarios is given
15This suggests that the price at the farm-gate is not a linear function of distance but has a has a kink
in it where the regime changes. This seems to be a testable implication of the model.
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by:
(16) EL(p) =

Pw − κF
α
(
1 + ln
(
κM+τM
κF
))
if Pw ≥ κM+τM
α
Pw − κF
α
(1 + ln αP
w
κF
)) if κF
α
< Pw < κM+τM
α
0 if Pw ≤ κF
α
When local markets are viable, changes in α and Pw have only a direct effect
on the expected price since the level of intermediation stays intact. Without local
markets besides the direct effect of a change in productivity or the world price on
the expected price, there is also a change in the level of intermediation.
As in the baseline case, the farmer’s decision to produce strawberries depends
on the expected price, and via it, on the level of intermediation. His best response
function is given in equation (7), where instead of the exogenous outside option
R we have R∗ from equation (14) and θmin is the solution to αEL(p) = 1.
Finally, we can pin down θM
∗
, the measure of traders in the local market.
In equilibrium, in order for the supply to equal demand the measure of traders
and farmers who go to the local market must be equalized so that the ratio of
their measures is unity. This poses no problem as at PM
∗
traders are indifferent
between their options (entering the local market, farm-gate trade or abstaining
from intermediation) and their measure in the local market adjusts to equal the
measure of unmatched farmers, e−θ
∗
. Thus,
(17) θM
∗
= e−θ
∗
.
Next we proceed to describe the types of equilibria and their properties in the
augmented model.
A. Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of the objects: θ∗ defined in equation (15), F (p), l(θ)
defined as in the baseline model, PM
∗
defined in equation (13), the farmer’s
reservation price R∗ given by equation (14), and the measure of traders in the
local market θM
∗
given by equation (17). As in the baseline model, both multiple
and unique equilibria are possible. Figure 4 shows the possible equilibrium types
as a function of the primitive parameters κM + τM and κF , for fixed values of
Pw and α. The topmost horizontal line κM + τM = αP
w separates the region
where local markets are viable from the region where they are not. For values of
κM + τM greater than αP
w we are back in the baseline setup with R = 0 and we
do not focus on this region here.16 The interesting cases lie below the line where
local markets are viable.
16More specifically, when κM + τM > αP
w, R = 0 and only the M and W regions are possible as
depicted in Figure 4. Note that local markets only exist in the M region when αPw−1≤κM+τM ≤ αP
w.
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0 κF
κM + τM
αPw
S − L
S − FL
W
W
M
M
αPw − 1
45o
Figure 4. Equilibrium Types in the κM + τM and κF space for sufficiently high P
w and α.
In the baseline case, producing the export good becomes the dominant strategy
for farmers when R exceeds 1/α. With local markets, the analogous condition is
that the farmer’s pay-off at the local market exceeds that of making the staple:
αPw − (κM + τM ) > 1. In Figure 4, the line κM + τM = αP
w − 1 demarcates
the region where producing strawberries is the dominant strategy from the region
where strawberries are produced only if the intermediation level is high enough.
The level of intermediation in turn depends on the ratio between the total cost
of accessing the local market, κM + τM , and the cost of farm-gate intermediation,
κF . With access to local markets, the export good can reach the world market
in two ways: via the local market or through an intermediary at the farm-gate.
When κM+τM < κF , the technology of farm-gate intermediation is dominated by
the technology of local markets, as the latter both costs less and provides certain
results. Thus, in Figure 4 farm-gate intermediation is not sustainable below the
450 line. Above the 450 line, whether intermediaries enter and farm-gate trade
exists or not, depends on whether or not farmers make strawberries.
The regions labeled S − FL and S − L lie below the κM + τM = αP
w − 1 line.
Here the farmer’s decision to make strawberries is independent of the the level of
intermediation, because the pay-off at the local market is higher than the pay-off
from making the staple. In region S − FL which lies above the 45o line both
farm-gate trade and a local market coexist. Below the 45o line the local market
is more efficient than farm-gate trade, so in region S −L strawberries are traded
exclusively at the local market.
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Above the κM+τM = αP
w−1 line, the farmer’s pay-off from selling at the local
market is less than what he would obtain from growing wheat. Thus, the local
market option no longer ensures strawberry production. Whether strawberries
are made or not depends on the level of farm-gate intermediation. In Figure 4
regions M and W lie both above the line κM + τM = αP
w−1 and above 450 line.
In region M multiple equilibria are endemic. As in the baseline model, in the
“good” equilibrium farm-gate trade coexists with local markets, and in the “bad”
equilibrium farmers produce wheat and intermediaries do not enter. As κF rises,
it reduces farm-gate intermediation until we switch to the region W where only
wheat is made. The switch occurs when farmers are indifferent between wheat
and strawberries, i.e., αEL(p) = 1 with intermediation at the free entry level.
This condition can be rewritten as17
κM + τM = κF e
(
αP
w
−κF−1
κF
)
.
IV. Policy Implications with Local Markets
As in the baseline case, with local markets the equilibria in region M, where
farmers specialize in the production of the staple, are inefficient. In this section
we discuss policies that can eliminate this inefficiency in the presence of the local
markets.
A. The Role of Infrastructure
There are critical differences in outcomes due to local markets. First, with local
markets, lower costs of accessing them can eliminate the inefficient equilibria that
occur in region M . This is because cheaper access to local markets boosts the
farmer’s outside option, making production of strawberries the dominant strategy
regardless of the level of intermediation. In contrast, a lower cost of accessing the
farm-gate, κF , cannot eliminate the coordination failure that causes farmers to
specialize in wheat in region M . The intuition is easy to see from Figure 4.
Starting at a point in region M, reducing κM + τM below αP
w − 1 moves the
economy from region M into regions where farmers specialize in strawberries and
the equilibrium is constrained efficient. Reducing κF would keep the economy in
region M .
Second, the effects on welfare of lower farm-gate and local market entry costs
differ, and their relative strengths depend on the level of intermediation prevailing
at the farm-gate. When intermediation is extensive, little is sold in local markets
so that reductions in costs of accessing them have a limited impact on welfare.
On the other hand, when there is little intermediation, most of the output gets
17Substituting θ∗ from equation (15) into the expression for the expected price given in equation (16)
and rearranging the terms yields the result.
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sold in local markets and reductions in the costs of accessing them for farmers or
traders raise welfare considerably.
To see this more formally, consider welfare with a viable local market. Each
unit of the export good is ultimately sold at Pw, irrespective of whether the
farmer makes the sale at the farm-gate or the local market, so the revenue from
producing the export good is αPw. The cost of farm-gate intermediation is κF θ
∗.
With probability e−θ
∗
farmers do not meet an intermediary at the farm-gate and
sell the produce at a local market, so the total cost for traders and farmers of
accessing the local market is (κM + τM )e
−θ∗ . Thus, welfare is given by: 18
(18) WL = αP
w − κF θ
∗ − (κM + τM )e
−θ∗ .
A unit fall in κM or τM raises welfare by e
−θ∗ while a unit fall in κF raises welfare
by θ∗. Sincee e−θ
∗
is decreasing in θ∗, reductions in κM or τM are more efficacious
in terms of raising welfare when θ∗ is low enough, which occurs when κF is high
relative to κM + τM and farm-gate intermediation is thin.
19
B. Agricultural Extension Programs
In many countries, including developed ones, considerable effort is devoted to
agricultural extension programs. These programs are usually directed towards
raising productivity in agriculture by introducing farmers to best practice tech-
niques. In our model, we think of agricultural extension programs as raising α,
the productivity of the farmer in strawberries. Both in the baseline model and
in the local markets extension, an increase in α can eliminate an inefficient equi-
librium and increase welfare. These beneficial effects are more pronounced in the
presence of local markets. This should be expected as all output is sold at the
world price rather than some going for a lower reservation price R.
Figure 5 describes the effect of a higher α in the baseline model. The line
R = 1/α shifts downward as α increases, and shrinks the M region where mul-
tiple equilibria occur. A higher α also increases the level of intermediation and
rotates the downward sloping line, where intermediation is just viable, to the
right. Finally, with a higher α, farmers specialize in strawberries at a lower farm-
18As in the baseline case welfare is equivalent to the expected earnings of the farmer as there are no
consumers and entry into intermediation is free. Formally,
WL = αEL(p) = α
[
Pw(1− (1 + θ∗)e−θ
∗
) +R∗(1 + θ∗)e−θ
∗
]
= αPw − α (Pw −R∗) e−θ
∗
− α (Pw −R∗) θ∗e−θ
∗
= αPw − κF θ
∗ − (κM + τM ) e
−θ
∗
where we take advantage of the fact that in equilibrium α (Pw −R∗) = κM + TM and
α (Pw −R∗) e−θ
∗
= κF . The expression makes sense as with local markets all of the good ultimately
gets sold in the world market.
19More precisely, ∂WL
∂(−κM )
= −e−θ ≥ ∂WL
∂(−κF )
= −θ when θ < 0.567. As θ = ln
(
κM+τM
κF
)
, this is
equivalent to (κM + τM ) < κF exp(0.567) = κF (1.76) . This makes sense as θ is low when κF is high.
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gate price, which shifts the αE(p) = 1 condition separating the region M and W
to the right. All of these expand the region where strawberries are made.20
κF
R
Pw
S −NF
M
S − F
W
1
α
αP
w
− 1
1
1.5α
1.5αP
w
− 1
Figure 5. Effect of a 50 percent increase in α on the equilibrium types without local markets.
Analogously, Figure 6 shows the effect of a higher α when local markets offer a
positive pay-off. In this case the inefficient equilibria (region M) occur at higher
costs of accessing the local market, κM + τM . A higher α raises the farmer’s
pay-off at the local market which shifts up the line κM + τM = αP
w − 1 below
which farmers specialize in strawberries regardless of the intermediation level. It
also shifts up the line κM + τM = αP
w below which local markets are viable. So
the regions S-FL and S-F, where farmers prefer to produce strawberries, expand.
Note that, with local markets, changes in Pw have the same effect as changes in
α as only the product of the two matters.
The change in welfare due to a rise in agricultural productivity is also greater
in the presence of local markets. In the baseline case, welfare in the constrained
efficient allocation is given by:
(19) W = αPw(1− e−θ)− κF θ,
which follows from equation (12) and setting R = R0 = 0. When α increases, it
causes a direct rise in welfare, as well as an indirect effect through an increase
in intermediation, which raises the share of output sold at Pw. Higher levels of
20Figure 7 shows that a higher world price similarly contracts the M region.
28 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
0 κF
κM + TM
αPw
1.5αPw
S − L
S − FL
W
W
M
M
αPw − 1
45o
(a)
0 κF
κM + TM
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1.5αPw − 1
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(b)
Figure 6. Panel (b) depicts the regions after a 50 percent increase in α or Pwon the equilibria
types with local markets relative to panel (a).
intermediation also involve higher costs of intermediation which have a negative
effect on welfare. Simple algebra shows that the change in welfare is given by
(20)
∂W
∂α
= Pw −
κf
α
.
With local markets, the level of intermediation is not affected and increases in
productivity are valued at the world price by society. To see this, differentiate
welfare in equation (18)
(21)
∂WL
∂α
= Pw.
As ∂WL
∂α
in equation (21) exceeds ∂W
∂α
in equation (20), it follows that local markets
enhance society’s (and the farmer’s) ability to benefit from productivity improve-
ments21. There are thus clear synergies between the creation of local markets and
productivity enhancing activities: the former helps farmers obtain more from the
latter.
21Since expected profits of traders are zero with or without local markets, social welfare is equal to
αE(p) in the baseline model and αEL(p) in the extension with local markets.
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κF
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Pw
1.1Pw
S −NF
1.1αPwαPw
M W
1
α
S − F
Figure 7. The dotted lines describe the new equilibria regions when Pw rises by 10 percent.
The M region and the S-F regions expand.
C. SPS Requirements
So far we have treated Pw as a competitive price determined in the world
market. However in developing countries exporters face low effective world prices
due to risks associated with SPS requirements. While fees for fulfilling the SPS
requirements are not large, the risks of failing them are high. For example, Ferrier,
Petersen and Landes (2012) estimate that in the case of Alphonso mangoes from
India the direct costs of production and SPS inspection fees account for about 30
percent of the final price. This cost estimate, however, ignores the risk of failing
the SPS inspection, which reduces the effective price that the exporters face. In
this regard, Roy and Thorat (2008), who focus on exports of grapes from India,
document that failure rates in meeting SPS requirements for new exports are as
high as 80 percent. All of these suggest that the effective price that exporters face
in the developing countries is significantly lower than the quoted market price.
We can think of the effective price that exporters face, PwSPS , as a function of
four things: the probability that the SPS requirements are met in the inspection
λ, the sunk SPS inspection fee ψ, the scrap value of the goods for export if they
fail the inspection S, and the price of the good after the SPS inspection has been
passed Pw. PwSPS can be written as
(22) PwSPS = P
wλ− ψ + (1− λ)S.
From equation (22) it is easy to see that higher effective price PwSPS works like an
increase in the world price Pw. In our model when the exogenous outside option
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is zero, a higher Pw has the same effect on welfare as a higher α, both with and
without local markets. This can be seen from (18) and (19) as only the product
αPw matters. As a result, a sufficiently high Pw ensures that farmers specialize
in the export good and that local markets are viable, expanding the region where
strawberries are made.
Since a higher effective price expands the regions where strawberries are made,
our model suggests that SPS requirements could prove to be a significant barrier
to exports (and specialization according to comparative advantage). A number
of policies could make passing SPS requirements less risky for the exporters in
developing countries. One such policy is verifying the SPS requirements at the
point of origin. If exports are inspected at the destination, products that do
not meet the SPS requirements are destroyed, so S = 0. If they are inspected
and certified in the country of origin, then S may be positive. This suggests
that ensuring SPS requirements are satisfied domestically increases the effective
price of exports. Similarly, policies that raise λ and reduce ψ increase PwSPS, the
effective export price.
Furthermore, Roy and Thorat (2008) document that SPS inspection failure
rates among Indian grape exporters fell to 1 percent within a year of exporting,
suggesting that λ rises as exporters gain experience in meeting the SPS require-
ments. To the extent that exporters learn from one another, exporting may raise λ
not just for a particular exporter, but also for other actual or potential exporters.
For example, new exporters could hire knowledgeable workers from experienced
exporters as they prepare to enter. For such reasons pioneers may not internal-
ize the benefits of a higher λ in the future. As a result, even products that are
viable in the long run may not be produced without interventions of some kind.
Partnerships with multinationals who have experience in meeting such require-
ments, providing insurance for early exporters, or direct government involvement
are possible remedies.
D. Pass-through of International Prices
Pass-through of world prices to the producer also differs with local market ac-
cess. With local markets, the level of intermediation is independent of export
price fluctuations, so the farm-gate price adjusts one for one in response to world
price changes. This follows from equation (16). Intuitively, a rise in Pw is ac-
companied by an equivalent rise in the local market price, which serves as the
farmer’s reservation price. Thus, traders’ profits remain the same and the change
in the world price is entirely passed into the farm-gate price. In other words, from
equation (16), when local markets are viable,
∂EL(p)
∂Pw
= 1.
In contrast, when farmers have no access to local markets their outside option
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stays constant, trader profits rise, as does the measure of intermediaries. In
this way some of the increase in Pw pays for the higher level of intermediation,
and the pass-through of the world price into the producer price is incomplete.
Differentiating equation (5) with respect to Pw and taking advantage of the fact
that ∂θ/∂Pw = 1/(Pw −R),
∂E(p)
∂Pw
= 1− e−θ < 1 for θ > 0.
In other words, without local markets the pass-through depends on the prevailing
level of intermediation: the thinner the market, the lower is the pass-through.
This is consistent with Fafchamps and Hill (2008) who find that the pass-
through of the changes in world commodity prices to producer prices is only
partial. Our model suggests why this happens, and suggests that it should be the
case in remote locations where intermediary markets are thin, and local markets
are not viable due to high cost of travel for farmers and traders.
As with other policies, local markets enhance the extent of welfare gains from
increases in the world price. This is easy to see because welfare in the constrained
efficient allocation, with or without local markets, is just the farmer’s revenue.
Our model thus helps answer why farmers, especially in poorly connected loca-
tions, seem to gain so little from higher world prices of their agricultural exports.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we develop a model of intermediation in the absence of binding
contracts and apply it to a Ricardian setting. This provides a new reason for
why developing countries specialize producing staples, despite the availability of
what seem to be more lucrative options. The inability of farmers and traders
to contract on price makes farmers subject to hold-up. The anticipation of such
hold-up in turn prevents farmers from exploring seemingly lucrative options.
A new role for marketing boards and for local markets emerges. Both can
provide farmers an outside option that discourages opportunistic behavior by
intermediaries. Local markets prove to be particularly effective policies in this
regard. Their presence also enhances efficiency, as the entire output finds its
way to the world market despite intermediation frictions, and allows farmers to
capture more of the gains arising from productivity improvements and higher
world prices. On the other hand, SPS requirements are shown to be particularly
damaging as they make the inefficiencies associated with hold-up more likely.
A case for intervention arises when there is learning by doing in meeting SPS
requirements that spills over to other producers. Incomplete pass-through of
export prices to producers at the farm-gate, a pattern observed especially in
remote areas, emerges naturally in this setting as well.
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Appendix
A1. Mathematical Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
We show that the support of the price distribution F (.) starts at R, has no gaps
and the distribution function is continuous, i.e., the density function has no mass
points. Since no farmer will accept a price below R, the support of F (·) cannot
include any such points. Suppose the support of F (·) starts at p > R. Then a
trader who offers a price in the interval
[
R, p
)
will only win if there are no other
traders, i.e., with probability P0 = e
−θ. His expected profit is:
πT (p) = α(Pw − p)l∗e−θ,
which is decreasing in p. Thus, the trader would be better off charging R, or any
price in
[
R, p
)
than offering p which contradicts the assumption that p is in the
support of the mixed strategy equilibrium.
Next, we establish that there are no gaps or atoms in the support of the dis-
tribution. Let us first rule out gaps in the support of the distribution. Suppose
there is a gap in the support of F (·): no one bids in the interval (p′, p′′). If there
is no mass point at p′′, then a trader who posts a price p∗ ∈ (p′, p′′) will be better
off than bidding p
′′
, as the probability of winning does not decrease, but the profit
margin rises. Hence, there are no gaps in the support unless there is a mass point
at p′′. Such a mass point would cause a jump down in profits at prices just below
p′′, and validate the gap in support of the posited price distribution. Can we
rule out such atoms at p′′? Yes, we can. If there is an atom at p′′, then bidding
p′′+ε causes a discrete jump in trader’s profits as he increases the offer price only
marginally, but this increases his probability of winning discretely.
The same argument rules out atoms at any p̂ in the interior of the support of the
distribution or at R: bidding p = p̂+ ε causes a discrete jump in trader’s profits
as he increases the offer price only marginally, but this increases his probability
of winning discretely. In equilibrium all prices in the support must yield the
same profits, hence such mass points cannot occur. They cannot even occur at
the upper end of the support. As will be confirmed later, the upper end of the
distribution support is given by pmax < P
w. If there were a mass point at pmax,
raising p slightly above pmax must raise profits which rules out a mass point at
pmax.
Next we can use the property of the equality of payoffs at every point of the
support to obtain the explicit expression for the cumulative distribution of bids,
F (p). Equating the expected profits at an arbitrary price p and expected profits
at the lower end of the support R , i.e., setting πT (p) = πT (R), we can uniquely
solve for the bidding function of the trader as a function of world price Pw, market
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thickness θ, and the farmer’s outside option R:
α(Pw − p)e−θ(1−F (p)) = α(Pw −R)e−θ
F (p) =
1
θ
ln
(
Pw −R
Pw − p
)
.
At the upper end of the support the cumulative density function equals unity.
Hence solving
F (pmax) = 1 =
1
θ
ln
(
Pw −R
Pw − pmax
)
for pmax yields the expression for the upper end of the support:
pmax = P
w(1− e−θ) + e−θR.

PROOF OF LEMMA 1: By definition, the expected value of the price the farmer
gets is
E(p) =
∞∑
k=0
QkEk(p)
= Q0R+
∞∑
k=1
Qk
[∫ pmax
R
pgk(p)dp
]
,
where
Qk =
θk
k!
e−θ,
Gk(p) = [F (p)]
k,
and
gk(p) = k[F (p)]
k−1f(p).
First we obtain the expected price when k traders show up and then take the
expectations over all possible realizations of k. The expected price conditional on
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the number of traders is
Ek(p) =
∫ pmax
R
pgk(p)dp
=
k
θk
∫ pmax
R
[
ln
(
Pw −R
Pw − p
)]k−1 p
Pw − p
dp for k ≥ 1
We start by solving for the indefinite integral, a key part of Ek(p)
(A1)
∫ [
ln
(
Pw −R
Pw − p
)]k−1 p
Pw − p
dp.
To do so we change variables. Let
x = ln
(
Pw −R
Pw − p
)
,
so that p in terms of x is p = Pw−e−x(Pw−R) and the corresponding differential
dp = e−x(Pw −R)dx. Using the change of variables, the integral (A1) becomes∫
xk−1
(
ex
Pw
(Pw −R)
− 1
)
e−x(Pw −R)dx
= Pw
xk
k
+ (Pw −R)(k − 1)!e−x
k−1∑
j=0
xj
j!
 .
Substituting for x in terms of p gives
pmax∫
R
[
ln
(
Pw −R
Pw − p
)]k−1 p
Pw − p
dp = A2 +A3
where
=
Pw
k
[ln(
Pw −R
Pw − p
)]k|pmaxR(A2)
=
Pw
k
[ln(
Pw −R
Pw − pmax
)]k −
Pw
k
[ln(
Pw −R
Pw −R
)]k
=
Pw
k
θk,
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and
= (Pw −R)(k − 1)!
Pw − p
Pw −R
[
k−1∑
j=0
[ln(P
w−R
Pw−p )]
j
j!
]|pmaxR(A3)
= (k − 1)!{(Pw −R)e−θ[
k−1∑
j=0
[ln(eθ)]j
j!
]− (Pw −R)[1−
k−1∑
j=0
[ln(P
w−R
Pw−R)]
j
j!
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Pw−R)
}
= (Pw −R)(k − 1)!{e−θ
k−1∑
j=0
θj
j!
− 1)}.
In evaluating the integrals we use the fact that Pw − pmax = e
−θ (Pw −R).
Next we find Ek(p) for k > 1 for the given integration limits.
Ek≥1(p|θ) =
k
θk
pmax∫
R
p
Pw − p
[
ln
(
Pw −R
Pw − p
)]k−1
dp
=
k
θk
[A2 +A3] = Pw + (Pw −R)
k!
θk
e−θ k−1∑
j=0
θj
j!
− 1

Hence the expected price conditional on at least one trader showing up is as
follows:
∞∑
k=1
QkEk(p) =
∞∑
k=1
θk
k!
e−θ
Pw + (Pw −R) k!
θk
e−θ k−1∑
j=0
θj
j!
− 1

= e−θPw(eθ − 1) + (Pw −R)e−θ(−θ)
where we use the fact that
∞∑
k=1
e−θ k−1∑
j=0
θj
j!
− 1
 = −θ.
This can be verified as follows:
∞∑
k=1
e−θ k−1∑
j=0
θj
j!
− 1
 = ∞∑
k=1
e−θ
 ∞∑
j=0
θj
j!
−
∞∑
j=k
θj
j!
− 1

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=
∞∑
k=1
e−θ
eθ − ∞∑
j=k
θj
j!
− 1

= −e−θ
∞∑
k=1
∞∑
j=k
θj
j!
= −e−θ
∞∑
j=1
j∑
k=1
θj
j!
The change in the order of summation in the last line can be verified by writing
out the expression before and after the change, and noting that the first term in
the former corresponds to the last term in the latter. Thus,
∞∑
k=1
e−θ k−1∑
j=0
θj
j!
− 1
 = −e−θ ∞∑
j=1
θj
j!
(
j∑
k=1
1
)
= −e−θ
∞∑
j=1
θj
(j − 1)!
= −e−θθ
∞∑
j=1
θj−1
(j − 1)!
= −θ.
Finally, the first moment of price is
E(p) = Q0R+
∞∑
k=1
QkEk(p)
= Pw − e−θ(Pw −R)(1 + θ).

